






High Food Prices and Developing 










Dept. of Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics 




Food and Resource Economics 










Funding for this project was provided by the Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy and Competitiveness Research 
Network which is funded by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.  The views in this brief are those of the authors 
and should not be attributed to the funding agencies.    
1 
 
1.0    Introduction 
 
  The last three years have been a roller-coaster ride for food prices.  After 
trending down in real terms since the 1970s, cereal and grain prices have 
experienced among the largest percentage price changes over the past 60 years 
(Sumner 2009). This episode serves as an important reminder that food prices can 
be highly variable within short periods of time; a lesson that many may have 
forgotten since the last such event in the 1972-74 period.  
 
Cereal food prices rose dramatically during the 2006-2008 period, more than 
tripling in some cases. Now, after a sharp fall from May to December 2008, those 
prices have risen again and remain one-third to one-half above long-term trends. 
This situation is costly for all consumers, both for the higher cost of food and for the 
variability in its price. High food prices will have negative impacts on poor families 
and more broadly on consumers in developing countries.  
 
These events raise two important questions: 1) what caused recent price 
increases, and 2) what can countries do to reduce these negative impacts, both 
independently (though domestic trade and support policies) and multilaterally 
(through organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and World Food 
Programme).  Within Canada, it raises the question of what the Government of 
Canada can and should be doing to deal with this price variability, especially in its 
aid policies toward developing countries. Should it be increasing food aid shipments, 
and should it be channelling its food aid differently? Or should it be helping 
developing countries modify their policies to limit negative impacts of high food 
prices? This paper reviews the recent price spike in an effort to understand its 
background and its effects on developing countries.  We discuss the responses that 
can be taken within those countries and by Canada to minimize the damage that 
higher food prices and food-price instability can cause to poor countries and poor 
people.  We conclude with a set of policy recommendations.  
 
 
2.0   Rising Prices and Vulnerable Populations 
 
  The 2007-2008 increase in global food prices was staggering.  Though down 
in recent months, the FAO’s (2008a) global food-price index was recently more than 
80 percentage points above 2007 levels (figure 1).  The price surge was led by 
cereals and by oils and fats, both of which were up by more than 100 points over 
2007.  Even though prices have declined from their mid-2008 peaks, they are still 
roughly 50 percent above their July 2006 levels in real terms (Sumner 2009). Price 
increases were experienced almost across the board, with the exception of dairy 
products.  Dairy prices have been trending down after sharp increases in early 2007. 
 
  The objective of this paper is to analyse policy responses to, and implications 
of, high food prices in developing countries.  Some context on the causes of high 
prices is required to understand the policy framework in which commodity prices are 
being determined.  This section briefly summarises some of the important factors 






Figure 1. Food-price Indices 
 
Source: FAO (2008a) 
 
  
The causes of high food prices can be broadly defined along two lines; 
supply-side and demand-side, with some phenomena (i.e. trade policies and energy 
prices) falling into both categories.  These causes must be analysed in front of a 
backdrop of low stocks-to-usage ratios for major grain crops; ratios that were at their 
lowest levels in more than 30 years.  While low stocks-to-usage ratios do not, in 
themselves, cause high prices, they do play a role in how responsive prices are to 
demand and supply shocks.  As Abbot et al. (2008) point out, food prices are not 
linear in stocks-to-usage ratios; prices are more sensitive to demand and supply 
shocks when stocks are low.   
 
  Perhaps the most controversial demand-side factor that has led to rising food 
prices is the conversion of land and crops from production of food to production of 
biofuels.  Soaring energy prices have increased the price at which converting food 
crops into energy is profitable, and has led to closer correlation between food and 
energy prices.  The effects of higher breakeven prices for the conversion of food 
crops into energy products has been exaggerated by government support and 
protectionist trade policies for biofuel development in the US and the EU.  Total 
support estimates (which include all forms of public support such as import barriers, 
direct and indirect subsidies and consumption mandates) for biofuel in 2006 have 
been estimated to be between US$ 5.9 and US$ 7.2 billion in the US and US$ 4.2 
billion in the EU (Steenblik, 2007).  The share of US maize production destined for 
ethanol production has been increasing rapidly (Figure 2); this trend has contributed 




































Figure 2.  US Maize Destined for Biofuel Production 
 
Source: USDA (2009) 
* forecast 
 
 Some  commentators  (Abbot,  et al., 2008)  have argued that high energy 
prices, rather than government policies, are the primary driving forces behind the 
increase in biofuel production.  However the two cannot be viewed independently.  
The infrastructure for producing and marketing biofuels would not exist without 
government policy interventions, and the resulting breakeven energy prices would be 
resultantly higher without trade protection and subsidies.  Von Braun (2008) 
estimates that almost one-third of the recent increase in cereal prices is attributable 
to expanded biofuel production, while a World Bank study (Mitchell, 2008) attributes 
as much as three-quarters of price increases to the effects of biofuels.  The range of 
estimated effects of biofuel production is wide, however it is clear that biofuel 
production is a significant factor in the recent upswing in food prices.  
 
   Evolving consumption patterns in developing-countries has also played a role 
in rising food prices.  As income rises in developing countries, the share of dietary 
protein and fat increases at the expense of cheaper starches.  Increased demand for 
feedgrains in the production cycle of livestock in developing countries has shifted out 
the demand for feedgrains and increased their prices.  However the role of evolving 
diets in recent price increases must not be overstated.  The evolution of dietary 
habits is a long-run phenomenon and not a short-run demand shock.  Increased 
demand for feedgrains in developing countries likely played a role in the drawdown 
of grain stocks over the past several years, but not a significant role in the recent 
food-price spike.  Also, India and China (the two countries most often cited as 
















markets.  It is also noteworthy that Chinese meat consumption has been trending 
down over the past three years (Abbot, et al., 2008), thereby casting doubt on a 
causal relationship between increased protein consumption in China and rapidly 
increasing food prices.   
 
  Increased speculation in commodity future markets is another demand-side 
factor that is commonly cited as a cause for high food prices.  While it is possible that 
more speculative trading activity increases price volatility, speculation in food 
markets is more a symptom than a cause of high prices in the current environment.  
A recent IMF (IMF, 2006) study demonstrated that causality runs from spot prices to 
financial flows in commodity markets, indicating that higher rates of participation in 
food commodity markets is the result, not cause, of rising food prices.   
 
  Important supply-side factors include high energy costs, crop failures in 
important exporting countries and decelerated productivity growth in agriculture.   
Energy costs act as both demand pull factors (increasing the breakeven value for the 
use of food crops in production of energy crops) and supply push factors by 
increasing production costs and augmenting the incentives to take land out of food 
production in favour of producing biofuel crops.  Abbott et al. (2008) argue that the 
demand-pull effects are the stronger of the two.  Higher crude oil prices have 
increased the costs of producing all products, not just food; however food-price 
inflation has rapidly outpaced broader measures of inflation in most countries.   
 
  Supply shocks in major exporting countries (Canada and Australia) through 
2005 and 2006 contributed to tighter cereal crop markets, however these shocks 
were not particularly large (four and seven percent annually, FAO (2008b)) and 
output has since recovered.  The effects of recently-higher yields are already evident 
in the latest fall in cereal prices (see figure 3).   
 
  Slower productivity growth has also been cited as an important contributor to 
higher food prices (FAO, 2008b; Von Braun et al., 2008).  Productivity growth in 
agriculture has been slowing for several years and has certainly contributed to the 
long-term reduction in stocks-to-usage ratios.  However the recent spike in food 
prices cannot be attributed to the long-term structural decline in public agricultural 
R&D and productivity growth.   
 
  The trade policies of several countries have played important roles in 
generating high food prices.  Several countries have raised new, or increased 
existing, export barriers and relaxed or removed import barriers in attempts to offset 
global market phenomena that are increasing domestic food prices.  These 
responses from developing countries are described in more detail in section three, 
however it is important to differentiate between those countries whose policies have 
and have not significantly affected world prices.  Several large countries (“large” as 
defined by output) have implemented export restrictions on wheat, rice, soybeans 
and other commodities; these include China, India, Brazil and Argentina.  However 
not all of these countries are “large” in the trade policy sense.  China and India 
together account for almost 50% of world rice consumption, but just over 10% of 
world rice exports (Abbott et al., 2008).  Export restrictions from these countries have 
not been key factors in the recent food-price spike.  The same holds for wheat 
exports   from  China  and  India.  Export  restrictions in important  Southeast  Asian   
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Figure 3. Cereal Prices 
 
Source: FAO (2008a) 
 
exporting countries have been relatively common and have had significant effects on 
world prices, however.  
 
The depreciation of the US dollar through 2007 and 2008 played a major role 
in rising food prices, which are generally traded and reported in US dollar terms.  A 
recent FAO report (FAO, 2008b) indicates that the recent spike in food prices is 
much less dramatic when food-price indices are adjusted to account for the recent 
fall in the US dollar.  Prices in 2008 were significantly higher than one year earlier 
when reported in alternative currencies, however domestic price effects in different 
countries depend on the exchange rate policies of trading partners.  For countries 
whose currencies appreciated sharply against the US dollar through 2007 and 2008 
(China, for example), the importation of food that is quoted in US dollars has become 
relatively cheaper.  Countries whose currencies have remained stable, or 
depreciated, against the US dollar (South Korea, Vietnam) have been faced with 
higher food import bills.   
 
  Finally, cross-price effects between cereals have been important features of 
the broad increase in food prices. Cereals are often close consumption substitutes to 






























































































































































substitutes.  An increase in the price for one cereal can trigger upward pressure on 
all cereals prices.  
 
This has relevance for the recent round of cereal price increases. Biofuel 
programmes appear to have had initial effects on the maize market at a relatively 
early stage in 2006. It is likely that this started to affect other cereals and soybean 
markets, especially by the next planting season in early 2007, contributing upward 
pressure on their prices. Similarly, the round of export restrictions that beset the rice 
market in the latter part of 2007 and early 2008 probably made some contribution to 
the continued rise in other cereals’ prices in the latter stages of the upward price 
cycle.  
 
The degree to which cereals prices are correlated over time illustrates these 
effects. We examined annual data so as not to have this relationship clouded by 
random short term fluctuations in individual cereals prices. Table 1 shows correlation 
coefficients between major cereals prices, using annual data from 1961 to 2005.  It 
shows that all nine cereals’ prices are highly correlated, ranging from 0.79 to 0.98. 
The correlations predictably decline using monthly data, with rice prices having the 
lowest (but still relatively high) correlations, between 0.62 and 0.74 with wheat, 
barley, and maize.  
 
Table 1. Correlation Coefficients Between Eight Cereal Crops 
Commodity Barley  Maize  Oats  Rice 
Milled 
Rice 
Paddy  Rye Sorghum  Wheat 
 Barley  1                      
 Maize  0.959  1                   
 Oats  0.954  0.935  1                
 Rice    
Milled 
0.937 0.931 0.895  1             
 Rice    
Paddy 
0.845 0.819 0.794 0.869  1          
  Rye  0.926 0.885 0.901 0.894 0.856  1       
  Sorghum  0.964 0.989 0.942 0.928 0.810 0.878  1    
  Wheat  0.975 0.974 0.944 0.940 0.827 0.917  0.978  1 
Source: FAO PriceSTAT, authors’ calculations. 
 
2.1 Distributional Effects of Rising Food Prices: Who is Affected? 
  Rising food prices affect everyone, but the degree of hardship on specific 
populations depends on five factors: income levels, the products that comprise a  
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population’s consumption basket, whether they are net food sellers or buyers, the 
share of food in total expenditure, and the degree of price transmission from world 
markets to local markets.  Table 2 provides a snapshot of food-price inflation in a 
range of countries from February 2007 to February 2008.  The wide range of inflation 
rates is striking, from near 1% in Japan to as high as 26% in Sri Lanka.  This wide 
range speaks to the differential impacts of rising food prices across countries and the 
need for non-uniform responses to high food prices across (and within
ii) countries.  
We now analyse the factors that determine the impact of high food prices on 
vulnerable populations. 
 
Table 2. Food-price Inflation 
Developing Countries  Developed Countries 
Country Food-price  inflation  (%)* Country Food-price  inflation  (%)* 
Guatemala 11.6  USA  5.1 
Sri Lanka  25.6  France  5 
Botswana 18.3  Germany  7.4 
India 5.8  UK  5.6 
Indonesia 11.4  Japan  1.4 
Pakistan 18.2 Greece  6.6 
South 
Africa 13.6  Spain 7.1 
Jordan 9.1  Switzerland 2.2 
Peru 6.4  Poland  7.1 
Senegal 10.9 Sweden 5.9 





Average  14.6 
*February 2007 to February 2008 
Source: OECD (2008) 
 
Income 
  Access to safe food of sufficient volumes is fundamentally a matter of income.  
Food-price spikes generate disquiet in high and middle-income countries, however 
such volatility does not typically generate large-scale nutritional shortfalls in these 
countries.  Such spikes can cause large-scale nutritional shortfalls in low-income 
countries where a large share of income is spent on food.  These events can lead to 
stunting, increased incidence of sickness and to the distress sale of productive  
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assets to purchase food.  The only viable long-term solution to food security issues is 
to increase the purchasing power of those most vulnerable to food-price increases; 
that is to increase their entitlement to adequate food supplies (Sen, 1999). 
 
  We focus on short-term policy responses to recent high food prices in this 
study, and not on transformational development strategies that could increase 
income levels over the long-term horizon.  Short-term responses such as targeted 
cash transfers to increase purchasing power can be effective in ameliorating the 
adverse effects of price spikes, and we discuss the role of these programmes in the 
recent food-price crisis in section three. 
 
Food Consumption Basket 
 
  It is difficult to draw conclusions about vulnerable populations from aggregate 
data that describe a nation’s food consumption basket.  Such data mask intra-
country dietary differences that are functions of income levels, and generally report 
the share of consumption expenditure spent on various categories of food, not the 
share of calories derived from each category.  For example, an average of 50% of 
food expenditure in Great Britain is on beverages and tobacco (Seale et al., 2003).  
This is fairly representative of developed countries where a large share of food 
expenditure is not directed towards meeting basic nutritional requirements.  This is 
not the case in developing countries where basic commodities’ shares of food 
expenditure are much higher.  For example, there is a strong negative correlation 
between income and share of food expenditure on cereals.  Consumers in many 
African and South Asian countries spend upwards of 40% of their food budgets on 
bread and cereals, compared to much lower shares (near 10% in much of Western 
Europe and North America) in richer countries (Seale et al., 2003).  It is also 
important to note that dietary habits vary widely within countries; the poor generally 
derive a much larger share of their calories from cereals and breads than the wealthy 
for two reasons.  First, low incomes often force consumers to cut back on relatively 
expensive protein sources.  Second, the poor often engage more in physical labour 
and need more calories to supply extra energy.  It is the poor who are most abjectly 
affected by the recent increase in relative and absolute cereal prices.   
 
  There exist substantial differences in grain consumption across countries that 
also determine the burden of higher cereal prices.  Those countries that rely 
relatively heavily on rice as their primary source of cereal consumption have, ceteris 
paribus, been more adversely affected because the rice price increase was larger 
than for other cereal commodities (see figure 3).  There are also differences in the 
level of processing in consumption baskets of consumers across countries and 
families.  Put differently, the cost share of food raw materials varies greatly across 
countries, income groups and food baskets. Consumers in developed countries tend 
to buy foods that are more heavily processed; these foods experienced smaller 
percentage cost increases relative to raw commodities.  This is also true when raw 
commodities are purchased in low value-added local markets compared to high-






Net Food Buyers or Sellers 
  The status of households as net food buyers or sellers is an important 
determinant in the impact of higher food prices on welfare. One must be careful, 
however, not to draw broad conclusions that rural dwellers are net food sellers based 
on aggregate data that report rural/urban splits within countries. The presumption 
that rural dwellers will fare less badly, or in fact benefit, from high food prices is not 
always the case. Only those rural populations who are net sellers of commodities 
and own the proceeds of their harvested food crops can benefit from higher prices.
iii 
And even among this group, many rural dwellers in Africa only sell food immediately 
after harvest and are net food buyers through the rest of the year.  Another 
complicating factor is that input prices that are positively correlated with energy 
prices (especially fertiliser and fuel) have tended to rise faster than output prices in 
recent years (IMF, 2008), thereby exacerbating the price-cost squeeze faced by 
agricultural producers.   
 
  Urban residents are generally net food buyers (the FAO (2008b) reports that 
7% of urban households are net food sellers compared to 31% of rural households 
among a sample of developing countries) and are therefore vulnerable to higher food 
prices without reaping the potential benefits of higher crop revenues.  There are two 
offsetting factors that determine how urban consumers will weather price swings.  
One factor is that urban residents are more likely to consume tradable processed 
foods whose prices are closely integrated with world price fluctuations.  If domestic 
trade and support policies are successful at insulating raw commodity prices from 
global volatility, then the global price effects on raw commodities may be smaller and 
urban residents may be more heavily impacted.  An offsetting factor is that urban 
residents’ diets are generally comprised of more heavily-processed foods; the 
percentage increase in the prices for processed foods was much smaller than for 
raw commodities.  This effect partially offsets the link to global commodity prices, 
and dampens the effects of commodity price increases.  These offsetting effects 
make it difficult to draw general conclusions about the impact of commodity price 
swings on urban vs. rural residents.  Another confounding factor is the degree of 
market instability for urban vs. rural dwellers.  Rural food markets that are not 
geographically integrated with other markets, though potentially detached from 
global price swings, are inherently more unstable because they rely on a small 
number of sources.  Urban markets generally have more diversified supply bases 
and are less vulnerable to small-scale shocks.  The fallout of these (often conflicting) 
effects is that the relative effects of global price increases are idiosyncratic and each 
case must be evaluated individually. 
 
Food Budget Share 
Consumers in developing countries are particularly vulnerable to food-price 
inflation because a relatively large share of their income is spent on food.  There is a 
very strong negative correlation between income and food’s share of expenditure; 
food expenditure shares range from above 70% in Tanzania and Nigeria to near 
10% in the US and Hong Kong (Seale, 2003).  Low-income food-deficit consumers 
who are faced with rapid food-price inflation have little room to adjust their 
expenditure patterns away from non-necessary
iv items.  An increase in food prices 
markedly reduces the real incomes of such groups.  
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The food budget share, or Engel coefficient, is a measure of food security and 
is an important measure of policy success in many developing countries.  It is 
appropriate at either the household or the national level. If incomes increase or food 
prices decrease, then the food budget share falls, consumers are in a more secure 
situation in procuring their food and food security is increased. In times like the 
recent food-price crisis, food security is decreased. The current recession further 
decreases food security by lowering incomes. This measure also shows that the 
poorer the country, the more likely it is to face food security difficulties after food-
price increases. 
 
Trade Policy and Global Market Integration 
 
A country’s trade policies are important determinants of the degree of 
transmission, or pass through, of international food prices to domestic markets.   
Several large food-exporting countries have raised export barriers in the forms of 
tariffs, quotas and bans in response to domestic pressures for food-price stability.  A 
large-country exporter that imposes an export tax shifts its excess supply function to 
the left, thereby lowering the quantity available on the world market.  The large-
country’s exports fall and domestic prices fall, ceteris paribus.  Such policies can 
have significant negative impacts on production incentives and generate domestic 
market distortions; we discuss these consequences in section three.   
 
  Several countries have also reduced import barriers in attempts to dampen 
domestic food-price inflation.  Lower import barriers increase food supplies on 
domestic markets and decrease domestic prices, ceteris paribus.  Though practiced 
by many countries over the last year, this tool has not had large effects in many 
cases because import barriers for food products were already low in many 
developing countries.   
 
  Table 3 provides a case study of world food-price pass through into domestic 
food markets.  A recent study by Dawe (2008) compared changes in food prices 
measured at world prices in US dollars, world prices in domestic currency (DC) and 
domestic prices faced by consumers in seven Asian countries.  The differences 
between columns (1) and column (2) largely reflect exchange rates effects.  Trade 
policies (as well as domestic price control programmes) account for the differences 
between columns (2) and (3).  As countries close themselves off from global 
markets, price signals are muffled.  The rate of pass through ranges from 6% in the 
Philippines to 64% in China; this large range illustrates the effects of international 
market integration on domestic prices.   
 
3.0    Policy Responses from Developing Countries 
 
  Developing-country governments often find that they must act to reduce large 
food-price increases in response to political pressures.  Most have followed two 
paths in their attempts to tame domestic food-price inflation and soften its effects on 
consumers; trade policies and domestic budgetary programmes. These two policy 
tools, though sharing the goal of reducing food prices to consumers, differ in their 




Table 3. Food-Price Pass Through - Cumulative Percentage Changes in Real 
Prices 
Country          (1) World Price 
(US$) 





through (%) = 
(3)/(1) 
 
Bangladesh  56 55 24 43 
  China  48 34 30 64 
 India  56  25  5  9 
  Indonesia  56 36 23 41 
 Philippines  56  10  3  6 
  Thailand  56 30 30 53 
 Viet Nam  39  25  3  11 
Notes: Data for China compare 2003 to 2007 (annual) and data for Viet Nam 
compare 2003 to 2006 (annual).  DC stands for “Domestic Currency”. 
Source: Dawe (2008) 
  
Before discussing a preferred response, we should note that the concern over 
food prices is essentially a concern over food security, a common and politically 
important national goal. The Engel coefficient provides guidance to appropriate 
policy. A policy that raises incomes or lowers food prices will enhance food security, 
and conversely. This is no substitute for examining the distributional effects of higher 
food prices, but it is good summary measure to show whether one is moving toward 
or away from a more secure food situation. For example, investing in agricultural 
productivity (research, human capital and infrastructure) is usually a high-payoff, 
income-increasing policy. Closing the border with trade restrictions does the reverse.  
Targeted price relief to low-income consumers can also enhance food security 
compared to across-the-board food subsidies. 
 
3.1 Trade Policies 
Trade policies include export taxes and bans, and reductions in import duties 
in attempts to reduce food prices. Both approaches lower domestic consumer prices, 
but they impose a tax on farm producers because the price decrease is across-the-
board. This will lower farmers’ incentives to produce the taxed commodity in the 
future, thereby reducing domestic production capacity. Also, the net effects of this 
policy will be to reduce domestic GDP (income) and increase world prices.   
Governments often find this policy option appealing because it lowers domestic 
prices and does not impose new direct costs on taxpayers.  
 
At least 30 (IMF, 2008) food-exporting developing countries (an up-to-date list 
can be found on the FAO website (2008c)) have erected export barriers in attempts 
to increase domestic food supplies and reduce domestic food prices.  Some 
measures of note include Argentina’s ban on wheat exports, a six-month ban on rice 




  The use of export restrictions to tame domestic food-price inflation is 
controversial and unadvised for two reasons.  The first is that restricting exports 
necessarily reduces global food supplies and applies upward pressure on global 
food prices.  The motivations of policymakers who implement such trade barriers are 
often clear; placation of domestic pressure (which has taken the form of riots in some 
countries) to reduce domestic food prices.  However such policies are necessarily 
beggar-thy-neighbour in that lower food prices at home come at the expense of 
higher food prices abroad.  Export restrictions simply export food-market instability 
abroad (Conklin, 2008). 
 
  Export restrictions are also controversial because they have negative 
consequences on future production by reducing incentives for higher output.   
Agricultural producers respond to price signals, and keeping food prices artificially 
low will not provide producers the signals they require to increase output to 
ameliorate shortfalls in the future.   
 
  Several developing countries have also reduced import barriers in attempts to 
tame domestic food-price inflation.  The FAO (2008c) reports that 22 developing 
countries have recently reduced import tariffs or increased import quotas as part of 
their efforts to constrain food-price inflation.  Nigeria has suspended all rice tariffs for 
six months, China has halved import tariffs on pork and protein meal products, 
Mexico removed all tariffs on wheat, rice and maize, and the Philippines has reduced 
its rice import tariffs.   
 
  The reduction of import barriers, though targeted at the same objective of 
lowering domestic prices, is fundamentally an opposite approach to the erection of 
export barriers.  Lower import barriers increase domestic food markets’ degree of 
global integration and facilitate the transmission of price signals to producers; export 
barriers do the opposite. But initial price effects on world markets are similar (raising 
prices) and the negative effects on domestic farmers are also similar. There are two 
important constraints on developing countries’ ability to use this tool to constrain 
food-price inflation, however.  The first is that many developing-country governments 
are highly dependent on import taxes as reliable sources of revenue.
v  Import tariffs 
are relatively simple to collect and can account for a large share of government 
revenues in developing countries.  A reduction in these revenues could negatively 
affect government finances and programme spending.  A second constraint is that 
food import barriers are already low in many developing countries.  Sharma and 
Konandreas (2008) estimate that average tariff rates on basic food commodities in 
low-income food-deficit countries are four, eight and six percent on wheat, rice and 
maize respectively.  There is very little room for lowering these rates.   
 
  Given the prevalence of evolving trade policies during the recent food-price 
spike, it is worth investigating whether such policies adhere to member countries’ 
WTO obligations.  The case of lower import barriers is clear; reductions are allowed 
(even encouraged) and can be increased at a later date up to the point that is 
prescribed by member countries’ commitments in the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture.  Export barriers are subject to disciplines under the 1994 GATT, which 
outlaws export bans for all developed countries and for developing countries that are 
net exporters of the commodity in question.  This discipline is waived in instances of 
domestic shortfalls, however, and it is almost inconceivable that a complaint would  
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be made against a developing country in the current situation.  Furthermore, export 
taxes are not disciplined, so export bans could easily be converted into prohibitive 
export tariffs and generate the same result (Sharma and Konandreas, 2008).  The 
Doha Development Agenda negotiations have not generated much in the way of new 
disciplines on export restrictions and prohibitions, other than sunset provisions on 
new barriers.  Export restrictions will continue to be policy options for WTO member 
countries in the future (Meilke, 2009).  
 
3.2 Domestic Support Programmes 
  Trade policies provide some insulation from global price increases, however 
developing-country governments are left with a large number of food insecure people 
once these policies have run their course.  A range of domestic support programmes 
have been implemented to offset the effects of food-price inflation.  Domestic 
budgetary programmes generally take the form of either across-the-board food 
subsidies or subsides that are targeted to specific groups. Here there are taxpayer 
costs which, in the case of non-targeted programmes, can be very high. Targeted 
consumer subsidies are a preferred option for two reasons. First, the budgetary cost 
can be greatly reduced compared to untargeted programmes. Second, because the 
market price effects will be much smaller with such programmes, this approach will 
not (significantly) tax food producers. The negative side to a targeted subsidy is that 
there are substantial administrative demands in setting up the institutions necessary 
to implement such a policy and to avoid corruption.   
 
  Direct food subsidies are perhaps the fastest method to lower the prices that 
are faced by consumers.  Honduras, for example, is selling government stocks of 
beans and maize at subsidised prices and Panama is selling paddy rice at 
subsidised prices (FAO, 2008c).  Such untargeted policies, though fast, are blunt 
and do not target the groups most in need of assistance.  Relatively wealthy 
consumers who spend more (though a smaller share of their total income) on food 
can be the largest beneficiaries of such programmes and, as a result, these 
untargeted subsidies can be unnecessarily expensive to governments.   
 
Cash transfers and domestic food aid programmes that are targeted at those 
who are most food insecure are preferred to general food-price subsidies.  Targeted 
programmes eliminate unnecessary expenditure by subsidising only those most in 
need.  Some targeted programmes, such as school-feeding programmes, also 
provide incentives for parents to continue sending their children to school in the face 
of high food prices.  Children are often removed from school during periods of food 
insecurity because tuition payments are required to buy food, and because children’s 
labour is used to generate additional income.  The removal of children from school, 
like the distress sale of productive assets, has negative long-term implications for 
economic growth and development. Also, targeted programmes can be tailored to 
different regions as well as to specific consumer groups within a region. The 
disadvantages of targeted programmes are the institutional difficulties of avoiding 
corruption where subsidized food is distributed to well-connected, and not 
necessarily poor, individuals. 
 
A range of other domestic programmes have also been implemented by 
developing countries, including higher salaries for state employees (Syria), lower  
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food taxes (Kenya and Brasil) and price controls (Mexico)
vi.  All of these programmes 
share a lack of targeting.  Relatively wealthy groups benefit from these programmes 
as much as, if not more than, a nation’s poorest groups (particularly in the case of 
higher state salaries).  There are also negative side-effects of these policies, 
including unnecessarily large government expenditures (or reduced government 
revenue) and disincentive effects for producers.  Difficult though they may be, 
targeted programmes offer the best hope of alleviating the burden of high food prices 
on those most affected in the short run.   
 
 
4.0    Responses from Abroad 
 
  The responses from developed countries and international organisations to 
high food prices have been piecemeal and ad hoc.  Reactions have ranged from 
increased emergency aid funding to the pronouncement of technical and policy 
advice at conferences and meetings.   
 
  The most concrete action to date has been in the form of increased levels of 
food aid.  Higher food prices have generated considerable anxiety at food aid 
agencies that are concerned that they will be unable to meet their programme 
requirements on fixed budgets.  The World Food Programme (WFP) issued an 
appeal in April of 2008 for an additional US$ 775 million after “recosting” their 
planned programmes in light of higher prices and a depreciated US dollar.
vii  The 
international community responded to this appeal and provided an additional US$ 
one billion in funding; Saudi Arabia alone provided US$ 500 million to this appeal 
(WFP, 2008).  Canada contributed US$ 163 in 2008; this makes Canada the third-
largest donor after the US and Saudi Arabia.  Canada also made a significant policy 
change in 2008 by removing all tying requirements for Canadian food aid.   
Canadian-funded food aid agencies were previously required to purchase 50% of 
food from the Canadian Wheat Board, which added cost and time delays to food aid 
projects.  Removing these requirements will increase the efficiency of Canadian food 
aid projects. 
 
  The effects of higher food prices on food aid shipments will differ across 
recipients.  The impact on specific countries depends on three main factors: 1) the 
commodity composition of their food aid baskets, 2) a recipient’s sources of food aid 
and 3) the substitutability of commodities within those baskets.  Figure 4 presents a 
broad-stroke assessment of how the cost of food aid baskets for major recipients will 
be affected by higher food prices.  Representative food aid baskets separated by 
commodity are computed using a three-year average of wheat, rice and maize food 
aid receipts
viii.  The price increases of figure 2 are applied to these representative 
food aid baskets to estimate the increased cost of procuring these baskets.  Those 
countries whose food aid baskets have been traditionally heavy in rice will see their 
costs increase the most.  South and Southeast Asia account for a large share of 
these shipments.  Many Sub-Saharan African countries receive food aid shipments 
that are relatively heavy in maize.  Maize price inflation has been much slower than 





  The calculations that form the basis of figure 4 are simplifications and one 
cannot project that food aid receipts will fall by the amounts indicated on the map.  
Food aid agencies have appealed for, and received, increased funding in response 
to higher prices.  Also, there exists some degree of substitutability between sources 
of food aid procurement (Tschirley and del Castillo, 2007) and between commodities 
within food aid baskets (Cardwell and Kerr, 2009).  As the relative prices of 
commodities rise in one source country relative to another, donors will move to 
procure food aid from relatively cheaper sources.  Also, there is some evidence that 
the commodity makeup of food aid baskets adjusts towards cheaper commodities 
when relative food prices change, particularly for emergency food aid.  Figure 4 also 
exaggerates the effects of higher prices because food aid agencies don’t generally 
pay the aggregate world prices that are quoted by the FAO; food aid is often bought 
at discounted prices or on favourable credit terms from a variety of sources.  The 
directions and magnitudes of price movements across sources should be similar to 
those in figure 2, however.  Despite efforts to procure food aid from small-scale 
traders and local markets in recipient countries, a large share of food aid is 
purchased from large commercial traders.  Many donors and aid agencies aim to 
increase the share of aid that is purchased locally, but these efforts are constrained 
by the need for large, safe and predictable orders that can often be satisfied only by 
large traders.  Such traders often have the option of selling on the world market at 
prevailing prices and there exists a high degree of price transmission from global 
markets to these traders. 
 
Figure 4.  Estimated Cost Increases of Representative Food Aid Baskets 
 
 
Sources: FAO (2008a), WFP, authors’ calculations 
  
  Several multilateral efforts have also been initiated under the banners of 
various intergovernmental organisations, such as the World Bank and the FAO.  The 
World Bank has announced a New Deal on Global Food to help with short, medium 
and long-term responses to high food prices.  The New Deal includes cash transfers, 








and FAO are also party to the United Nations’ Global Food Crisis Task Force, which 
was struck to facilitate policy coordination between agencies.   
 
5.0    Effects on Developing Countries 
 
  The effects of the increase in food prices on developing countries have been 
alluded to several times in the foregoing discussion. To summarize briefly, higher 
food prices: a) create political pressures to provide relief, b) increase inflation rates, 
c) negatively affect government budgets if relief programmes include consumer 
subsidies, and d) change trade policies if relief programmes involve export 
restrictions or reduced tariffs. Governments may be pressed to provide some offset 
to producers to compensate them for the decline in their prices. If there is an agency 
that is responsible for food prices or stocks, then such a crisis places pressure on it 
to procure adequate stocks to respond to pressures, and it will place further pressure 
on the government to provide the agency with sufficient resources to do so.  These 
bureaucratic developments open the door to increased corruption in the agency and 
the government. 
 
  We can illustrate two country responses from Southeast Asia, drawn from 
current and previous food-price episodes in Vietnam and Indonesia. In the case of 
Vietnam, world rice prices doubled in 1992/93 for the better part of a crop year. The 
response of the government was to protect consumers’ interests by stopping (new) 
rice exports for the period. The ban was easily enforced due to the preeminent role 
of a state-owned enterprise that was the designated sole rice exporter. The result 
was predictable: domestic rice prices rose only slightly and maintained a flat 
trajectory, while world prices spiked and then fell. Vietnam responded in the same 
way this time as in 1992/93. They banned all new rice exports in an effort to keep 
rice prices low for consumers.  
 
  This was an effort to insulate urban consumers as much as possible from the 
rice price increases, using an export ban as their policy tool. In effect, the 
government chose a non-targeted price reduction programme whose costs were 
borne primarily by rice farmers. Although supply responses from rice farmers were 
likely muted following these export bans, the country is such a large rice exporter 
there was probably no effect on domestic rice supplies from the lower farm price; any 
reduction was at the expense of future exports.  
 
  Indonesia chose a different route in response to the (domestic) rice price 
increase of 1998, and the current (world market) rice price increase. The Indonesian 
government relied on a targeted rice price subsidy in 1998, distributed through the 
state enterprise, the Rice Logistics Agency (BULOG). In this case, the agency’s 
distribution network and storage facilities were already available, and the agency 
lobbied for the resources to undertake the large operation.  Although there is 
acknowledged to have been substantial corruption in the process, the programme 
met with some success in targeting poor consumers.  
 
  More recently, the tripling of world prices coincided with a fortuitous series of 
large rice harvests in Indonesia, which reduced the country’s dependence on high-
priced imports. The domestic price therefore has not increased significantly, although 
it was already high enough that the margin over the world price shrunk from about 50  
17 
 
percent to near 10 percent. The targeted rice subsidy still exists and has been 
institutionalized into a new programme, known as “rice for the poor”, with BULOG 
still administering it with a large budget. This difference in policy response between 
Indonesia and Vietnam reveals not only a difference in the weight attached to 
consumer interests versus farmer interests, but also the substantial political clout 




  The share of households’ budgets that are allocated to food increases when 
food prices rise, and this necessitates reductions in expenditures in other areas. This 
problem is made more severe by the coincidence of food-price spikes with 
recession-induced reductions in jobs and incomes.  
 
  We know, from observations on previous such crises, that there is great 
diversity in how poor consumers are affected by rising food prices. But when faced 
with mounting food costs, households are forced to make reductions in some areas 
of food consumption and there is likely to be an increased incidence of malnutrition 
among the poorest groups. When this affects children, it can lead to numerous long-
term obstacles, depending on the type of nutritional shortfall.  Malnutrition episodes 
of some types have been estimated to result in productivity losses of up to 10 
percent of lifetime earnings and GDP losses of 2-3 percent in the worst affected 
countries (Alderman, 2005).  
 
  An instructive example comes from Indonesia at the time of the 1998 financial 
crisis. Due to a dramatic depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah, traded goods’ prices 
doubled and tripled. A policy decision was made to double the price of rice. Although 
a targeted subsidy was applied, it was a small programme that benefitted a relatively 
small number of poor households. 
 
  Helen Keller International, an NGO that focuses on vision-related health 
issues, collected detailed food consumption data on a sample of poor families that 
provided comparisons of consumption patterns before and after the doubling of rice 
prices.  The striking result was that rice consumption did not significantly decrease. 
However, consumers cut back significantly in many other food areas, notably on 
protein and micro-nutrients. Consumption of eggs, fish and meat were cut back most 
severely.  These new diets contained insufficient levels of vitamin A, and led to 




6.0    Future 
 
  Predicting food-price levels is always difficult, but we know what history tells 
us: price levels will decline from peaks and resume their long-run trends, which over 
the period since World War II has been a decline in real terms (Sumner, 2009). Two 
important factors must be considered in the outlook, however. First, if biofuel 
programmes continue around the world as they now exist, then there is a permanent 
shift in the allocation of food resources to energy resources. This suggests that food 
prices will not fall to their previous (pre-2006) levels, but remain at a higher level.  
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Second, to what trend lines will food prices return? The trend may resume a 
downward trajectory, but be less steep due to the decline in agricultural research 
spending that has occurred since the early 1990s. These factors lead to the 
expectation of more slowly-declining real food prices, and prices at a higher level 
than prior to the recent price spike.  
 
Future food-price variability may be even more important than the future price 
level for food-insecure households. Whether due to global warming and more 
variable rainfall, or due to government policy responses, it would appear that cereals 
prices are likely to exhibit more variability than in the past 50 years.  The link 
between energy prices and food prices will solidify and fuel market instability will 
translate into food-price variability.  
 
The recent food crisis and concerns about food security will likely lead to a 
host of new polices across countries. There is a risk that these policies could take 
the form of inefficient and costly policies, such as food self-sufficiency policies. 
Another policy response, both by national governments and by multilateral and 
bilateral aid agencies, is to re-establish the importance of agricultural research and 
productivity.  This would be an effective response to the food-price crisis, and should 
be encouraged.  
 
Finally, food aid policies might also become more prominent. This response 
rests mostly with developed-country governments and aid agencies, rather than with 
developing-country governments. We expect an increase in resources allocated to 
this activity above recent years, but not in comparison to the peak of funding reached 
in 2008.  A renegotiation of the Food Aid Convention, which commits donor countries 
to minimum volume donations each year, may be expedited by recent events. 
 
7.0    Conclusions 
 
  Food price increases over the 2006-2008 period have raised two issues of 
special concern to developing countries: 1) rapidly rising food prices after 30 years of 
general real declines, and 2) a substantial increase in food-price variability. The latter 
has been emphasized by the decline in food prices between mid-2008 and the end 
of the year, followed by another shift upward in food prices during the first half of 
2009. This situation is not necessarily new, but after a lengthy period with minimal 
concerns over these matters, and with real food prices now so much lower than they 
were 50 years ago, there is whole generation of government policy makers and aid 
agency personnel who must become acquainted with what are largely previously-
learned lessons.  These important lessons include: 
 
•  Food prices matter.  This is especially true where there are large numbers of 
poor people, and when price increases are rapid.  
 
•  Many small farmers are net food buyers, and therefore lose from rising prices. 
Even among net food sellers, landless farmers lose the apparent advantage of 
higher prices by having to pay compensating higher land rents when food prices rise. 
Farm land owners are the only clear beneficiaries of higher food prices, and only if 




•  Food-price instability is a scourge of poor consumers and is costly to farmers, 
making this as difficult a problem as increased prices.  
 
•  A food-price crisis leads to long-overdue attention to farm productivity, 
including investments in agricultural research, extension and training, and 
infrastructure. This is the silver lining, if there is one, to a food-price crisis. 
 
•  Food aid budgets may be insufficient.  The renegotiation of the Food Aid 
Convention may be the appropriate forum for this issue. 
 
  A number of policy recommendations follow from this food-price crisis. First, 
food security policies are useful. A central feature should be the adoption of policies 
to improve agricultural productivity. This can be done within a poor country, but 
should also involve developed countries that can support agricultural research 
through multilateral agencies like the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR). This also involves multilateral agencies like the World Bank, the 
regional development banks, and bilateral aid agencies like the Canadian 
International Development Agency, where investments in agricultural research can 
be complemented with investments in extension education and rural infrastructure. 
 
  Second, some price relief to consumers in high-price periods is often 
politically necessary. However, it should be done using targeted (instead of across-
the-board) subsidies to keep the costs down.  Targeted policies also minimise 
subsidy-induced reductions in domestic prices that affect farmers and diminish future 
productive capacity. The establishment of low-price food shops, to which only certain 
individuals have access, is one option. Each country’s options will depend on the 
administrative capability and existing institutions within the country. 
 
  Further, consumer subsidies should be financed using budgetary instruments, 
not by consumers through border restrictions. Following this recommendation will not 
increase (and may decrease) the food budget share, thereby helping to improve food 
security. A food crisis is no time to disengage from world markets by following 
policies of domestic food self-sufficiency or export bans. 
 
  Food aid can also be a helpful contribution from developed-country 
governments and international agencies, especially to target extra supplies and 
lower prices for selected commodities and in selected regions. It should be 
undertaken in a manner that limits the price-depressing effects on farmers, as 
discussed for across-the-board consumer subsidies. This can include school-feeding 
safety nets, as is being done by the World Food Programme. Supplying food aid is 
an activity that the Canadian International Development Agency is familiar with, and 
it could be institutionalized to provide such support rapidly whenever a threshold of 
food-price inflation is met. 
 
  Longer-term policy improvements, particularly in developed countries, include 
reforming of biofuel policies to avoid the conflict with food production. This can be 
achieved by focusing on crops other than cereals and on the production of biofuels 
on land not intensively used for food production. Another longer-term response could 
be the introduction of a strategic food reserve, as proposed by the International Food  
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Policy Research Institute (von Braun, 2008) and as already undertaken on a local 
scale in countries such as Cambodia, Thailand, and India. 
 
  Finally, to act effectively and with coordination across countries, there is a 
need for a much better information system about what the impacts of higher food 
prices are on poor families, where the problems are most severe, and how effective 
policy responses are on the ground. Good quality information requires local-level 
data collection on a regular basis, which is rare.  Data collection is often forgotten at 
a policy level by domestic governments and multilateral agencies alike, because it 
does not appear to directly increase food supplies in the short run. 
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i See Abbott et al. (2008) and FAO (2008b) for more detailed treatments of these causes.   
ii Experiences also differ widely within countries.  See discussion, below. 
iii In Indonesia, for example, three-quarters of the poor are net rice consumers, so rice price increases 
have hurt them, even though the bulk of those defined as poor are in rural areas. 
iv The term “non-necessary” is used here instead of “luxury” because expenditure is often moved 
away from education and health care; categories which can scarcely be regarded as luxuries.  
v Many developing countries have weak revenue collection infrastructures, and personal and 
corporate incomes are often so low that any collected tax revenue is small.   
vi See FAO (2008c) for an up-to-date list of policies. 
vii The depreciated value of the US dollar in 2008 magnified negative effects on NGOs and charities 
because many such organisations receive budgetary commitments in US dollars. 
viii Wheat, rice and maize account for more than 90% of cereal food aid shipments.  Cereals make up 
80-90% of food aid shipments in most years.  (WFP Interfais) 